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I
INTRODUCTION
My comment on Professor Resnik's very stimulating article' will discuss
the goals of aggregating litigation and the circumstances in which aggregation
works best in achieving those goals. I will then discuss how this analysis
relates to the aggregation of personal injury cases.
Aggregation has both substantive and procedural goals. The substantive
goals are (1) to ensure civil enforcement of legal rules where the stakes of the
individual beneficiaries of those rules provide inadequate incentive to bring
individual lawsuits; (2) to provide compensation to the beneficiaries of legal
rules where those rules have been violated and the beneficiaries have thereby
suffered damage; and (3) to ensure that like cases are treated alike. The
procedural goals of aggregation are (1) to conserve public and private
resources by reducing the number of proceedings that hear and determine
identical procedural and factual issues and (2) to preserve those resources by
encouraging settlements.
II
THE SUBSTANTIVE GOALS OF AGGREGATION
The aggregation of plaintiffs may ensure civil enforcement of legal rules
where the individual stakes of the beneficiaries of those rules are too small to
provide an incentive for the beneficiaries to bring their own actions. The
paradigm of this kind of lawsuit is the shareholder derivative action brought
to enforce the fiduciary obligations of officers and directors of the
corporation. In companies with vast numbers of shareholders, no particular
shareholder is likely to have sufficient potential benefit from enforcement of
that fiduciary obligation to offset the high cost of bringing the lawsuit. There
is thus a collective action problem. Whatever recovery is obtained would go
to the corporation and would produce only an increase in the value of all
shares, whereas the cost of bringing the suit would be borne entirely by the
plaintiff. Individual shareholders thus have too little incentive to sue on their
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own and too much incentive to become free riders while some other
shareholder bears the laboring oar of bringing the litigation.
The solution to this problem has been to allow a single shareholder to
bring a lawsuit in the name of the corporation and to reward counsel for the
shareholder with attorney's fees from any recovery that is made. This
procedure, of course, creates a problem. Because derivative actions are
driven by the quest for counsel fees, a divergence of interests results between
those who control the suit (counsel for the plaintiff) and the beneficiaries of
the suit (the corporate shareholders). Thus, the usefulness of derivative
actions has long been controversial and has led to the imposition of various
statutory and judicially created restrictions on such actions.
Applying this framework to personal injury cases, few collective action
problems exist except where there are a large number of potential plaintiffs
with very minor injuries. This is such an unusual circumstance, however, that
it does not warrant detailed analysis.
With regard to the goal of compensation, aggregation works best where
the recovery goes to a single recipient-in the case of the derivative action,
the corporation-or where individual damages can be calculated easily-for
example, in a securities case in which the price of a security on one date is
subtracted from the price on another date and the difference is then
multiplied by the number of shares held by each member of the class.
It is more difficult to justify aggregation in the name of compensation
when cases involve mass torts. Each plaintiff has a distinct life expectancy,
expectation of future earnings, exposure to pain, and degree of emotional
suffering, among other factors. Aggregation necessarily limits the individual
attributes that can effectively be taken into account, and seems justified only
where the achievement of procedural goals so reduces the cost of litigation
that plaintiffs are better off with their individual circumstances considered in
such a limited fashion.
Aggregation does further the goal of treating like cases alike and, where a
substantial number of cases involve a common factual situation, aggregation
ensures consistency in result. Aggregation of tort cases emerging from, for
example, a building collapse or an airplane crash thus seems desirable. Even
here, however, aggregation will be beneficial only with regard to the issue of
liability and only where the substantive claims of all plaintiffs are identical.
III
THE PROCEDURAL GOALS OF AGGREGATION
Aggregation can reduce the costs of litigation for the parties and promote
judicial economy by reducing the number of proceedings in which identical
procedural and factual issues are heard and decided. Aggregation of this kind
can be achieved in class actions, through multidistrict litigation procedures, or
by the assignment of multiple cases to a singlejudge. With regard to personal
injury cases, aggregation will work where the legal and factual issues are
identical for all parties; thus, the procedural steps can serve all cases rather
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than just one. Again, an airplane crash or a building collapse is the best
example.
Aggregation will not adequately serve this procedural goal where the facts
differ between individual cases. In such circumstances, it is difficult to
aggregate damage issues because each plaintiff has a unique claim. Where
toxic torts are concerned, moreover, exposure of the various plaintiffs may
differ significantly; consequently, each plaintiff may have a different case with
regard to causation. This problem is especially acute where the particular
ailments alleged to have resulted from exposure to specified toxic materials
are also found in persons with no known exposure to those toxic materials. In
contrast, aggregation seems more appropriate where the particular ailments
result only from exposure to the designated toxic material and are not found
in the population generally. The Agent Orange case 2 falls into the first
category because almost all of the ailments claimed were found in the
population generally and had other known causes. Asbestos cases often fall
into the latter category because asbestosis and mesothelioma result only from
exposure to asbestos. Another factor compounding the difficulty of
aggregating toxic tort cases is that the laws of various states concerning
liability often differ.
Aggregation of cases also promotes settlement. In multidistrict litigation,
aggregation allows cases to be scheduled for trial faster than if each were
litigated individually. The proximity to trial is an important factor in causing
settlement. Class actions raise somewhat different issues in that defendants
generally resist aggregation. Once all or most of the possible plaintiffs are
included in the action, however, defendants do have an incentive to settle and
avoid the costs of further litigation. Moreover, once a critical amount of
money has been offered in settlement, counsel for the plaintiff class may
conclude that only a decreasing percentage of any further increase in recovery
will be allocated to the fee award, while their own costs increase and the risk
of total loss continues. At that point, counsel for the plaintiff class also has a
powerful incentive to settle.
In the personal injury area, using aggregation to force settlement will
greatly reduce litigation costs but will impede achieving the goals of law
enforcement and compensation. In particular, aggregation may lead to
recoveries far below the total damage suffered. Counsel for the plaintiff class
generally will prefer a certain recovery with a large fee to the continuance of
litigation in which the percentage of recovery going to fees decreases, costs
increase, and the risk of loss remains. Of course, individual lawsuits in the
absence of aggregation may be so costly that the net amount going to
plaintiffs in individual cases would be even less than a class settlement
notwithstanding the recovery of full damages.
2. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 100 FRD 718 (EDNY 1983), aff'd, 818 F2d 145
(2d Cir 1987).
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Aggregation may also skew the distribution of recoveries among the
plaintiffs. In particular, aggregation may undercompensate the strongest
cases and overcompensate the weakest. The costs of determining individual
damages in distributing the class fund among the plaintiffs may be high, and
the award to each plaintiff will often be determined by an easily applied rule of
thumb. This seems particularly likely in toxic torts cases, where a few strong
claims are swamped by a large number of weak ones. In the Agent Orange
case, for example, the number of class claimants was enormous, and all were
allowed to share in the settlement fund without any proof of exposure to
Agent Orange or evidence that their ailment was caused by Agent Orange.
IV
CONCLUSION
Aggregation of tort cases can best be justified where liability issues are
severed from determination of individual damages and in cases involving
common factual inquiries. Aggregation of damage issues should be restricted
to those extraordinary cases in which the costs of individual litigation are so
large that even the strongest plaintiffs are unlikely to net adequate recoveries.
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